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Abstract
We consider how the information sources people use to test
hypotheses change as the sparsity of the hypotheses – the
proportion of items in the hypothesis space they include –
changes. Specifically, we focus on understanding how requests
for positive and negative evidence, which have been shown to
be sensitive to hypothesis sparsity (Hendrickson, Navarro, &
Perfors, in prep), are influenced by requests for specific in-
stances, which show a positive bias and less sensitivity to spar-
sity (Markant & Gureckis, 2013). We find that people modify
their information requests as a function of the sparsity of the
hypotheses and they do so in this task primarily by by manip-
ulating the rate of requesting positive and negative evidence.
Furthermore, by simulating the set of possible remaining hy-
potheses, we find that people were most likely to select the
information source that maximized the expected reduction in
uncertainty across hypotheses. We conclude by discussing the
implications of these results for models of hypothesis testing.
Keywords: Confirmation bias; positive test strategy; hypothe-
sis testing; information search;
Introduction
How does a child learn what will float in water and what will
sink? Certainly not by studying the calculus that underlies
the equations for density, volume, and buoyancy. Instead, she
might start by asking for examples of things that float and
things that sink. She might also ask if specific objects float,
like a small rock or a duck. If the goal of each information
request is to minimize her uncertainty across her hypotheses
about what objects float, then on average some types of infor-
mation requests are going to be more informative than others,
and which kinds of requests are better might change over the
course of learning. In this current work we investigate if peo-
ple are sensitive to differences in the informativeness of these
types of information requests in a game-like task.
Foundational studies in the area of hypothesis testing
showed that people have a propensity to fixate on one pos-
sible hypothesis and be biased to select test queries that gen-
erate positive results with respect to that hypothesis in tasks
like discovering a number rule in the 2-4-6 number game
(Wason, 1960; Klayman & Ha, 1989) or testing a verbal rule
in the Wason card selection task (Wason, 1968; Klayman &
Ha, 1987). This behavior was originally presented as a de-
viation from rational testing strategies since these informa-
tion requests did not maximally reduce the uncertainty about
which hypothesis was true given the full space of possible
hypotheses (Nickerson, 1998).
The strategy of selecting tests that are likely to generate
positive results is rational in certain domains (Oaksford &
Chater, 1994). Positive tests are adaptive when hypotheses
are sparse with regard to acceptance – that is, hypotheses are
likely to respond YES to only a few possible queries. For in-
stance, the category DOGS is sparse because most items are
not dogs; most categories are similarly sparse. In situations
with sparse hypotheses, generating positive tests with regard
to a small subset of hypotheses (or a single, current one) will
eliminate a high proportion of potential hypotheses and there-
fore minimize uncertainty about the true hypothesis (Navarro
& Perfors, 2011).
Are people sensitive to hypothesis sparsity? Some evi-
dence (Figure 1), from studies in which information requests
were limited to evidence requests – random examples of ei-
ther positive or negative evidence – has shown the proportion
of positive evidence requests increases as sparsity increases
(Langsford, Hendrickson, Perfors, & Navarro, in press; Hen-
drickson et al., in prep). In the converse case, when people
are only permitted to ask about specific examples (instance
requests), people are also sensitive to sparsity (Markant &
Gureckis, 2013). In both cases, there was an additional bias
toward preferring positive tests, although the size of the bias
was much stronger for instance requests.
None of these studies, however, matches the task of a child
learning what floats in water. Allowing only evidence re-
quests corresponds to preventing the child from asking about
a specific item and allowing only instance requests prevents
asking for an example of something that floats or sinks. More
generally, they do not map onto the real-world tasks learn-
ers face where they can make both types of information re-
quests and must choose between them. In the current study
we present a task where people were asked to find one correct
hypothesis with the option of making an instance request or
an evidence request of their choosing. We manipulated the
sparsity of the hypotheses and also analyzed the utility of the
information requests to evaluate whether people were making
choices sensibly. We find that people are sensitive to hypoth-
esis sparsity, particularly when it comes to making evidence
requests, and in general are sensitive to the utility of the infor-
mation in choosing between evidence and instance requests.
Experiment
This experiment evaluates what types of information partic-
ipants use when attempting to search through a large set of
possible hypotheses. The experiment took the form of a game
loosely based on the game “Battleships”, where people try to
identify the location of ships, but were allowed to make in-
formation requests by selecting either a specific instance or
a type of evidence. Every possible configuration of the ships























Figure 1: Data from Hendrickson et al. (in prep). People are
sensitive to sparsity of the hypotheses, choosing positive evi-
dence more often when hypotheses are more sparse in a task
in which the information options were limited to postive and
negative evidence requests. There is also a slight overall pos-
itive test bias, particularly when hypotheses were less sparse.
Error bars indicate standard error.
sparsity of those hypotheses was manipulated by changing
the size of the ships.
Method
Participants We recruited 600 participants through the
Amazon Mechanical Turk website, each of whom played the
game three times. 47% were female and they ranged in age
from 18 to 69 with a mean of 34.1. They were from 25 coun-
tries: 67% from the USA, 29% from India, with all other
countries less than 1%. We report results from the 501 partic-
ipants who completed all three games, made at least one in-
formation request on each game, and made no more than 100
such requests on each game. Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of 9 sparsity conditions, described below, with
the sample size for conditions ranging from 49 to 73. The
mean completion time was 16 minutes, and participants were
paid US$0.60 for their time.
Materials and procedure Participants were shown a 20-
by-20 grid filled with 5 rectangles (“ships”) as illustrated in
Figure 2. The sizes of the rectangles varied across conditions
and no rectangles within a condition were exactly the same
shape and size. The instructions explained that each rectangle
had a hidden true position within the grid and their goal was
to guess the hidden locations as closely as possible, which
they could indicate by moving the visible rectangles to match
those locations.
People were allowed to request information in one of three
ways. They could click a button to request a piece of posi-
tive evidence (a HIT). If this option was selected, a randomly
chosen grid cell that was within the true hidden location of a
rectangle was marked on screen with a red box as in Figure 3.
Figure 2: Sample view at the beginning of a trial from the
condition in which the sparsity of each hypothesis is 30%
(that is, the area covered by the five rectangles constitutes
30% of the grid). Participants could click and drag rectangles
to move them within the grid or click the buttons at the bot-
tom to generate information requests: a HIT was a request for
positive evidence, a MISS was a request for negative evidence,
and asking about a LOCATION was an instance request.
They could also request negative evidence (a MISS) in which
case a random grid cell that was not occupied by the hidden
location of a rectangle was shown in blue. We refer to these
two types of requests as evidence requests. Finally, they could
select a specific cell by clicking on it, and it would be labelled
as either a hit or a miss depending on whether that cell was
occupied by one of the hidden locations of the rectangles. We
refer to this kind of request as an instance request.
After each information request, participants could move
the rectangles within the grid. They were not permitted to
make additional information requests until their current guess
of the rectangle locations was consistent with all revealed
information. People were asked to indicate they were done
when they felt confident in their guesses about the hidden po-
sition of the rectangles. Afterwards they were shown the po-
sition of the hidden rectangles and their final guesses. They
were also given a score based on the Euclidean distance be-
tween their final guesses and the actual positions, divided by
the number of information requests.
There were nine experimental conditions, defined by the
proportion of the grid covered by rectangles, which ranged
from 10% to 90% in step sizes of 10%. Because each pos-
sible hypothesis corresponds to a configuration of rectangles,
every hypothesis within a condition had the same sparsity: in
the 20% condition, every valid hypothesis implies that 20%
of the cells were hits, and 80% were misses. By manipulating
the size of the rectangles across conditions, we were able to
control the overall sparsity of the hypothesis space. Partici-
pants played three games each, all within the same sparsity
condition. The first game was a practice task in which they
608
Figure 3: Sample view from the same condition as Figure 2
after 25 information requests. Requests that produced an in-
stance within a hidden rectangle are colored red, while in-
stances outside the hidden rectangles are colored blue. Af-
ter each information request the participant had to move the
rectangles into a position that is consistent with all of the in-
formation. This is one possible arrangement of rectangles
consistent with all information requests.
were instructed to try each information source at least once
and familiarize themselves with the game. We analyze results
from the second and third games only.
Results
Evidence requests Does the proportion of positive and
negative evidence requests change as a function of the spar-
sity of the hypotheses? Figure 4 shows a significant effect
of hypothesis sparsity on the proportion of requests for both
positive evidence (F(1,499) = 21.95, p< 0.0005) and nega-
tive evidence (F(1,499) = 104.6, p < 0.0005). As hypothe-
ses became less sparse, positive evidence requests were in-
creasingly less likely: the slope of the line of best fit was
-0.25. The pattern was the opposite for negative evidence,
with more negative evidence requests occurring when the hy-
potheses were less sparse (the slope of the line of best fit was
0.40).
With the introduction of the possibility of instance re-
quests, one might ask whether the relative proportion of pos-
itive to negative evidence requests parallels that found in
Hendrickson et al. (in prep) and shown in Figure 1. Indeed,
looking only among actions in which participants made ev-
idence requests, shown in Figure 5, reveals a very similar
pattern to what was found previously. The relationship be-
tween the proportion of positive to negative evidence requests
is characterized by similar slopes of the line of best fit (0.57
in this study, 0.6 in the previous one) and intercept at 50%
sparsity (0.71 in this study, 0.61 in the previous one).
Instance requests The instance requests, shown by the































Figure 4: The proportion of information requests across hy-
pothesis sparsity. Across all levels of sparsity participants
made all three types of requests. The proportion of positive
and negative evidence requests were strongly influenced by
hypothesis sparsity, The effect of sparsity on on instance re-
quests was much less strong. The solid line shows positive
evidence requests, the dotted line shows negative evidence,
and the dashed line shows instance requests. Error bars indi-
cate standard error.
sity conditions. Though people were very sensitive to sparsity
when making evidence requests, they appeared to be less so
when making instance requests. Although the effect of spar-
sity was significant (F(1,499) = 6.4, p = 0.01), the slope of
the line of best fit was less steep at -0.1. People were slightly
more likely to ask about specific instances when the ships
were smaller.
Were people selecting good instances when they requested
a specific instance? As discussed by Navarro and Perfors
(2011), an instance request maximizes expected information
gain if the proportion of hypotheses consistent with it is 50%.
If the sparsity is 20%, a random instance will be within a rect-
angle in an average 20% of hypotheses: selecting an instance
that is within a rectangle in closer to 50% of hypotheses im-
proves information gain. Conversely, if the sparsity is 80%,
to increase information gain the learner should select an in-
stance with a lower than average probability of a being within
a rectangle. To compute the proportion of hypotheses consis-
tent an instance it is necessary to know what hypotheses have
still not yet been ruled out; this is computationally intensive
because this must be calculated for every request made by
every participant on every game. At each of these points we
therefore simulated a pseudo-random subset of all possible
valid rectangle-position hypotheses. These were used to es-
timate, for each information request by each participant, the
probability that it was located within a rectangle across all
possible rectangle-position hypotheses.1
120 games were simulated in most conditions due to compu-























Figure 5: People are sensitive to the sparsity of hypotheses
when considering only evidence requests. Even if partici-
pants had the option of requesting instances, the ratio of pos-
itive to negative evidence requests matches closely the pro-
portion of positive requests when instance requests are not
available, as shown in Figure 1 from Hendrickson et al. (in
prep). Error bars indicate standard error.
The probability of a chosen instance being within a rectan-
gle was strongly influenced by the sparsity of the hypothesis
space (F(1,378) = 107, p < 0.0005, slope = 0.46) as shown
by the solid line in Figure 6. Despite being influenced by the
sparsity of the hypotheses, instances were not selected ran-
domly – if they were, one would expect that the probability
of any instance being located within the rectangle would be
the same as the sparsity of the condition (this is reflected in
the dashed line in Figure 6). We find that the instances peo-
ple requested were shifted towards being equally likely to be
within or outside a rectangle.
Expected utility of all information requests Why does the
rate of positive and negative evidence requests depend on the
sparsity of hypotheses, even when instance requests are taken
into account? One possible explanation is that regardless of
request type, people use a heuristic that picks information
sources which are more likely to produce positive evidence
when hypotheses are sparse. This heuristic predicts the linear
changes seen in Figure 4 and Figure 5. An alternative expla-
nation, first proposed by Oaksford and Chater (1994), is that
people choose information sources based on how useful they
expect those sources to be, and that this utility is sensitive to
sparsity. One method to assess utility in this task is to look
at the expected change in uncertainty about which hypothe-
sis is correct for each information request option (for further
discussion about different metrics of utility during hypothesis
randomly by considering the set of possible hypotheses generated
by permuting the locations of all rectangles to create a set of 120
base hypotheses then shifting each rectangle in each of those base























Figure 6: People do not select instances randomly. The y axis
shows the probability than an instance selected by a partici-
pant is actually in a hidden rectangle. The dotted line reflects
what would happen if people were choosing them randomly:
it would parallel hypothesis sparsity. The probability of se-
lecting a positive instance does depend on hypothesis sparsity
(slope=0.46). Error bars indicate standard error.
testing see Markant and Gureckis (2012)).
Does the relative utility of evidence requests and instance
requests drive information requests beyond hypothesis spar-
sity? We address this by using the results of the previous
simulations. For each possible information request on each
action we estimated the expected reduction in the set of re-
maining hypotheses.2 We then compared the utilities of each
kind of information request. If people were sensitive to rela-
tive utility, one would expect that they would be more likely
to choose an evidence request when it had higher utility than
an instance request, and to choose an instance request when
it had higher utility than an evidence request. As Figure 7
shows, that is exactly what people do. The left panel shows
actions in which the utility of evidence is higher than the util-
ity of any instance; at all sparsity levels people are more likely
to make evidence requests.3 The right panel shows the op-
posite situation; people were more likely to make instance
requests when an instance had higher utility than either evi-
dence type. Across all levels of hypothesis sparsity, the most
frequently chosen information response option was also the
highest utility option. This suggests people were sensitive to
the relative utility of each information request type and used
this information appropriately.
For most levels of sparsity3 Figure 7 shows that at some
times during a game instance requests had higher utility and
at some times evidence requests did. How does utility de-
pend on time, and why? Intuitively, positive evidence re-
quests have higher utility than any instance when getting one
2Following Austerweil and Griffiths (2008) the expected reduc-
tion is weighted by the probability of obtaining each evidence type.
3For sparsity levels 40 and 50, evidence requests were never
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Figure 7: Proportion of information request types across spar-
sity. The plot is split into two panels based on which type of
information request had higher utility on that action. Across
all levels of sparsity people were most likely to pick the most
useful information type on that action.3 Error bars indicate
standard error and stars show significant differences as indi-
cated by a Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc test.
piece of positive evidence eliminates a high proportion of hy-
potheses. This occurs when hypotheses are sparse and most
hypotheses have not been eliminated yet. Negative evidence
seems to be most useful among early requests where hypothe-
ses are not sparse at all. The left panel of Figure 8 confirms
this intuition and shows that when sparsity was more extreme
(either very high or very low), for early actions during a game
the evidence requests had higher utility than the best instance
option. However, this changed in the final actions: the best
instance request had higher utility than an evidence request at
all sparsity levels. Intuitively, this is because by this point in-
dividuals have narrowed down the ship locations to the point
that they are deciding between just a few highly overlapping
hypotheses. In this case, asking about the particular points
on which those hypotheses differ is more informative than
asking for evidence which may not differentiate between the
remaining hypotheses.
People are sensitive to the shift in utility between request
types across the course of a game. As Figure 9 shows, in-
stance requests were more frequently made at the end of the
game than in the beginning (F(1,998) = 72, p < 0.0005)).
This effect was modulated by an interaction with hypothesis
sparsity (F(1,998) = 6.3, p = 0.01), which suggests the dif-
ference was strongest when hypotheses were more sparse.
Discussion
In this paper we focus on understanding how sensitive people
are to changes in the underlying hypothesis space when se-
lecting different kinds of information during hypothesis test-
ing. We find that even when they had the option of testing
specific instances, they still often chose to make evidence re-
quests asking for a HIT or a MISS. Moreover, the proportion
l l l l l l l l l
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Figure 8: Utility of the best evidence request type and best
instance request as a function of when in the game the re-
quest occurred. Left panel: During the first 20% of actions
evidence requests had a significantly higher utility than the
best instance request for extreme sparsity levels. Right: In
the last 20% of actions instance requests had a higher utility
than evidence requests. The black line indicates the best evi-
dence choice, the grey line indicates the best instance choice.
Error bars indicate standard error and stars show significant
differences as indicated by a Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc
test.
of time that they preferred positive evidence was sensitive to
sparsity. The sensitivity of evidence request type to hypoth-
esis sparsity is one example of an underlying sensitivity to
the utility of the different kinds of information requests avail-
able. People were most likely to select the information re-
quest type that was most informative about which hypothesis
is correct. Moreover, this was not driven entirely by the ini-
tial hypothesis sparsity: which option had the highest utility
changed throughout each game, and people were sensitive to
these changes.
That said, as in Hendrickson et al. (in prep), our findings
suggest that people are not perfect: we did observe a positive
bias in evidence requests. As shown in Figure 5, although the
proportion of positive requests is sensitive to sparsity, peo-
ple have a tendency to make more positive requests than they
should, especially at sparsity levels over 50%. This is not
true of instance requests in all conditions, Figure 6 shows that
people show a positive bias when hypotheses are sparse but
a negative bias when they are not. Regardless of sparsity,
the optimal instance to select is within a rectangle on 50% of
hypotheses; people select instances that are less likely to be
within a rectangle when hypotheses are sparse but select in-
stances more likely to be within a rectangle when hypotheses
are not sparse. One possibility for why bias among instance
and evidence requests is different is that people are follow-
ing different strategies for evidence and instance requests.
When requesting instances, people may be aiming for the






























First 20% of actions
Last 20% of actions
Figure 9: Proportion of instance requests across sparsity of
hypotheses. Across all levels of sparsity participants made
more instance requests in the last 20% requests of a game
than in the first 20% requests. The black line indicates the
average number of instance requests in the first 20% requests,
the grey line is for the last 20% requests. Error bars indicate
standard error.
only choosing such requests when they are discriminating be-
tween a few specific hypotheses, and by choosing points that
would eliminate some of those hypotheses. Such a strategy,
implemented non-optimally, would lead to a pattern of results
as in Figure 6: the natural direction to be pulled away from
optimal would be towards the informativeness of a random
instance in that condition. We aim to investigate this issue
further.
These results extend the growing body of work demonstrat-
ing that people are sensitive to the sparsity of the hypotheses
(Langsford et al., in press; Markant & Gureckis, 2013; Hen-
drickson et al., in prep) in two critical ways. First, this study
is the first comparison between request types within the same
task and shows that sensitivity to hypothesis sparsity is not
a function of having a limited set of request types. Instead,
when given both evidence and instance request types, peo-
ple are most likely to select the most useful type of request.
Second, we believe the complexity of this task, with a large
set of potential hypotheses and the full range of information
request types, is the closest approximation of real-world hy-
pothesis testing that has so far been considered in the litera-
ture of hypothesis testing. The request types and hypotheses
in this “Battleships”-style game are not fundamentally differ-
ent in complexity from a child learning what objects floats, a
tourist learning which Australian spiders have deadly poison,
or any of the other hypotheses people test and learn everyday.
If most hypotheses we encounter in the real world are
sparse (Navarro & Perfors, 2011), why do people in this
task bother with adjusting their responses as a function of
sparsity and do not follow the simple always-select-positive-
evidence heuristic? We believe the choice between many
different types of information requests might drive the im-
portance of hypothesis sparsity both in this task and in the
real world. People strive to select the information request
type that is most useful in reducing uncertainty (Oaksford
& Chater, 1994) and the utility of request types depends
heavily on the sparsity of the hypotheses (Navarro & Per-
fors, 2011). Therefore any computational model of hypothe-
sis testing must move beyond simple bias-based heuristics to
incorporate mechanisms that mirror human behavior and are
sensitive to information utility and hypothesis sparsity when
selecting among different information request options to test
hypotheses.
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